

Frontier Outposts in Sylhet and Cachar.

Serial 3.

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... Byrabee Te a Jhulnacherra Chattachoora Roopacherra ... Loharbund

These distances differ somewhat from those given by Colonel Roberts.

Memorandum by Colonel Roberts, Deputy Quartermaster General, on Lushai Policy and Frontier Defence.

The recent expedition into the Lushai country was so far successful that, in all probability, no raids will be committed, either in the direction of Cachar or Chittagong, for many years to come; but the recollection of the heavy punishment which has been inflicted will pass off in course of time, and new chiefs will arise eager to follow the example of their ancestors, unless advantage is now taken of the work done by the two columns to place the defence of the frontier on a satisfactory footing.

It appears to be the accepted policy of Government that "the tribes should be left to manage their own affairs," or, in other words, that there should not be a military occupation of the country; our jurisdiction being confined to that portion lying within a line to be drawn from the north-west corner of Arracan, along Chittagong, Hill Tippera, and Cachar, to Muneepore, on which line such posts should be established as would effectually prevent the Lushais from crossing the border for the perpetration of outrages.

Nothing occurred during the expedition to warrant any change being made in this policy; we have therefore now only to consider whether any better line of defence can be selected than the one originally proposed. One of the principal objects of the expedition was to obtain such information of the frontiers of Cachar and Chittagong as would enable the question of their defence to be definitely settled, and there is no doubt but that we are now in possession of sufficient data to admit of our deciding on the proper measures to be adopted. admit of our deciding on the proper measures to be adopted.

We know with tolerable exactness the strength and power of the several tribes. We can trace with certainty the routes by which the raiders have advanced into our territory; and, with the exception of the tract of country in front of Hill Tipperah, we have an intimate knowledge of the various ranges of mountains which surround the British possessions.

As far as Cachar and Chittagang are concerned, therefore, we ought to have no difficulty in selecting the best positions to occupy, and the proper garrisons for those positions; but until a survey of the Hill Tipperah frontier has been made, it is not possible to say where the connecting posts could most effectively be placed. Taking the Cachar frontier first, and travelling from east to west, we find that protection is required from the Barak river to the Chattachoora Peak, between which the following ranges of hills run parallel to each other, and nearly at right angles to the line of defence, viz .:-

The Boobuns, between the Barak and the Sonai; The Nunvai, between the Sonai and the Rookni; The Rengti, between the Rookni and the Dullessur; and The Hajick, between the Dullessur and Hill Tipperah.

It is along the crests of these hills that the Lushais have invariably approached when raiding on the tea gardens of Sylhet and Cachar, and it is on these hills, there-

fore, that our posts should be established. With the solitary exception of the one near Chattachoora, all our posts have hitherto been situated in valleys beween these ranges, and have evidently been selected more with a view of giving confidence to the planters and their coolies, than for

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